Oleksandr Byelkin added a comment - 2020-04-28 07:19 commit d08860b28f3645bb59275941e56d63bef7ea3e05 (HEAD > bb-5.5 MDEV-22374 , origin/bb-5.5- MDEV-22374 ) Author: Oleksandr Byelkin <sanja@mariadb.com> Date: Tue Apr 28 09:16:33 2020 +0200 MDEV-22374 : VIEW with security definer require FILE privilege from definer not invoker in case of INTO OUTFILE Check INTO OUTFILE clause always from invoker.

Oleksandr Byelkin added a comment - 2024-09-30 13:37 > +create table t1 (a int); > +create definer=test@localhost sql security definer view v1 as select * from t1; > +# check that ot works without view   typo "it"   > +select * INTO OUTFILE '../..//tmp/test_out_txt' from t1; > +# check that ot works without file   same why "//" ?   > +select * from v1; > +a > +# rights for file should be taken from current user not view > +select * INTO OUTFILE '../../tmp/test_out_txt' from (select count(*) from v1) as dv1; > +select * INTO OUTFILE '../..//tmp/test_out_txt' from (select * from v1) as dv1; > +select * INTO OUTFILE '../..//tmp/test_out_txt' from v1;   same   > +drop view v1;   please add reverse tests too:   +create sql security definer view v1 as select * from t1; +connect(con1, localhost, test); +error 1045; +select * INTO OUTFILE '../..//tmp/test_out_txt' from t1; +select * from v1; +error 1045; +select * INTO OUTFILE '../../tmp/test_out_txt' from (select count(*) from v1) as dv1; +error 1045; +select * INTO OUTFILE '../..//tmp/test_out_txt' from (select * from v1) as dv1; +error 1045; +select * INTO OUTFILE '../..//tmp/test_out_txt' from v1; +connection default;   > +drop table t1; > +drop user test@localhost; > +# End of 5.5 tests > diff --git a/sql/sql_parse.cc b/sql/sql_parse.cc > index ae5a6b4cd35..515990c879f 100644 > --- a/sql/sql_parse.cc > +++ b/sql/sql_parse.cc > @@ -2206,15 +2206,15 @@ mysql_execute_command(THD *thd) > lex->exchange != NULL implies SELECT .. INTO OUTFILE and this > requires FILE_ACL access. > */ > - ulong privileges_requested= lex->exchange ? SELECT_ACL | FILE_ACL : > - SELECT_ACL; > - > - if (all_tables) > - res= check_table_access(thd, > - privileges_requested, > - all_tables, FALSE, UINT_MAX, FALSE); > - else > - res= check_access(thd, privileges_requested, any_db, NULL, NULL, 0, 0); > + if (lex->exchange) > + res= check_access(thd, FILE_ACL, any_db, NULL, NULL, 0, 0); > + if (!res) > + { > + if (all_tables) > + res= check_table_access(thd, SELECT_ACL, all_tables, FALSE, UINT_MAX, FALSE); > + else > + res= check_access(thd, SELECT_ACL, any_db, NULL, NULL, 0, 0); > + }   No, I think this special check for a special SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE case is wrong. Why does the server even checks global privileges via views? It should not do it, I think, not for FILE not for any other global or db level privilege. I'd try something like   diff --git a/sql/sql_acl.cc b/sql/sql_acl.cc --- a/sql/sql_acl.cc +++ b/sql/sql_acl.cc @@ -4699,7 +4699,7 @@ bool check_grant(THD *thd, ulong want_access, TABLE_LIST > Save a copy of the privileges without the SHOW_VIEW_ACL attribute. It will be checked during making view. */ - tl->grant.orig_want_privilege= (want_access & ~SHOW_VIEW_ACL); + tl->grant.orig_want_privilege= want_access & ~SHOW_VIEW_ACL & TABLE_ACLS; }   mysql_rwlock_rdlock(&LOCK_grant); diff --git a/sql/sql_parse.cc b/sql/sql_parse.cc --- a/sql/sql_parse.cc +++ b/sql/sql_parse.cc @@ -5204,7 +5204,8 @@ check_table_access(THD *thd, ulong requirements,TABLE_LIS> Register access for view underlying table. Remove SHOW_VIEW_ACL, because it will be checked during making view */ - table_ref->grant.orig_want_privilege= (want_access & ~SHOW_VIEW_ACL); + table_ref->grant.orig_want_privilege= + want_access & ~SHOW_VIEW_ACL & TABLE_ACLS;   if (table_ref->schema_table_reformed) {