Details
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Bug
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Status: Closed (View Workflow)
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Major
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Resolution: Fixed
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None
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None
Description
After invertigating joseph.witthuhn comment, and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed as RFC 6125 indicate, hostname verification should be done against the certificate’s subjectAlternativeName’s dNSName field.
RFC 2818 discouraged the CN verification > 10 years ago, as it was only intended for legacy. The Baseline Requirements require a subjectAltName, and require that the only host-ish names in a CN must be a name also in the SAN.
That is not compatible with connecting directly aurora host.
Correction is to permit legacy CN verification when SAN doesn't match hostname.
Attachments
Activity
Field | Original Value | New Value |
---|---|---|
Fix Version/s | 2.1.1 [ 22619 ] |
Description |
After invertigating [~joseph.witthuhn] [comment|https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-503?focusedCommentId=98224&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-98224], and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed. |
After invertigating [~joseph.witthuhn] [comment|https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-503?focusedCommentId=98224&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-98224], and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed. [RFC 2818|https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818] discouraged the CN verification > 10 years ago, as it was only intended for legacy. The Baseline Requirements require a subjectAltName, and require that the only host-ish names in a CN must be a name also in the SAN. According to [RFC 6125|https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc6125], hostname verification should be done against the certificate’s subjectAlternativeName’s dNSName field. The check is done against the certificate’s commonName field, but commonName is deprecated and has been deprecated for quite a while now |
Description |
After invertigating [~joseph.witthuhn] [comment|https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-503?focusedCommentId=98224&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-98224], and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed. [RFC 2818|https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818] discouraged the CN verification > 10 years ago, as it was only intended for legacy. The Baseline Requirements require a subjectAltName, and require that the only host-ish names in a CN must be a name also in the SAN. According to [RFC 6125|https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc6125], hostname verification should be done against the certificate’s subjectAlternativeName’s dNSName field. The check is done against the certificate’s commonName field, but commonName is deprecated and has been deprecated for quite a while now |
After invertigating [~joseph.witthuhn] [comment|https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-503?focusedCommentId=98224&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-98224], and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed as [RFC 6125|https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc6125] indicate, hostname verification should be done against the certificate’s subjectAlternativeName’s dNSName field. [RFC 2818|https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818] discouraged the CN verification > 10 years ago, as it was only intended for legacy. The Baseline Requirements require a subjectAltName, and require that the only host-ish names in a CN must be a name also in the SAN. That is not compatible with connecting directly aurora host. Correction is to still permit CN verification when SAN doesn't match hostname. better : permit to provide custom hostname verification if that is not needed. |
Description |
After invertigating [~joseph.witthuhn] [comment|https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-503?focusedCommentId=98224&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-98224], and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed as [RFC 6125|https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc6125] indicate, hostname verification should be done against the certificate’s subjectAlternativeName’s dNSName field. [RFC 2818|https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818] discouraged the CN verification > 10 years ago, as it was only intended for legacy. The Baseline Requirements require a subjectAltName, and require that the only host-ish names in a CN must be a name also in the SAN. That is not compatible with connecting directly aurora host. Correction is to still permit CN verification when SAN doesn't match hostname. better : permit to provide custom hostname verification if that is not needed. |
After invertigating [~joseph.witthuhn] [comment|https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-503?focusedCommentId=98224&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels%3Acomment-tabpanel#comment-98224], and verification on SSL with aurora :
Issue is that when certificate has alternate names, only alt-name verification is executed as [RFC 6125|https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc6125] indicate, hostname verification should be done against the certificate’s subjectAlternativeName’s dNSName field. [RFC 2818|https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818] discouraged the CN verification > 10 years ago, as it was only intended for legacy. The Baseline Requirements require a subjectAltName, and require that the only host-ish names in a CN must be a name also in the SAN. That is not compatible with connecting directly aurora host. Correction is to permit legacy CN verification when SAN doesn't match hostname. |
Summary | Hostname verification must take in account CN when having alt-name | Add legacy SSL certificate Hostname verification with CN even when SAN are set |
Status | Open [ 1 ] | Confirmed [ 10101 ] |
Component/s | TLS [ 13805 ] | |
Resolution | Fixed [ 1 ] | |
Status | Confirmed [ 10101 ] | Closed [ 6 ] |
Workflow | MariaDB v3 [ 82218 ] | MariaDB v4 [ 135006 ] |
I appreciate that you are taking a look at this. I do have an open case with AWS (since August 2nd) where they are investigating fixing the Aurora certificates from their end. They haven't provided an ETA yet, but that is likely a better "long term" fix, assuming the fix eventually gets pushed out to all of their users.